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During the second half of the 1990s the comparative growth performance of Europe vis-à-vis the 
United States has undergone a marked change. For the first time since World War II labour 
productivity growth in most countries that are now part of the European Union (EU) fell behind the 
U.S. for a considerable length of time. Until the beginning of the 1970s rapid labour productivity 
growth in the EU went together with a catching-up in terms of GDP per capita levels on the U.S.. A 
first break in this pattern occurred in the mid 1970s. While catching-up in terms of labour productivity 
continued, the gap in GDP per capita levels between the EU and the U.S. did not narrow any further 
after 1975 (see Figure 1). This differential performance reflects the slowdown in the growth of labour 
input in Europe, which was related to increased unemployment, a decline in the labour force 
participation rates and a fall in average working hours. The second break, which is the focus of this 
paper, occurred in the mid 1990s when the catching up in terms of  labour productivity also came to a 
hold once the average EU level reached the U.S. level. In fact a new productivity gap opened up since 
1995. Whereas average annual labour productivity growth in the US accelerated from 1.3% during the 
period 1980-1995 to 1.9% during 1995-2003, EU productivity growth declined from 2.3% to 1.3%.2  
 
The striking acceleration in U.S. output and productivity growth in the mid 1990s has been much 
discussed in the literature. A consensus has emerged that faster growth can at least in part be traced to 
the effects of the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution (Oliner and Sichel 
2000, 2002; Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000; Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2003), which in turn has depended 
on a surge in ICT investment, strong productivity effects from ICT-producing industries and a more 
productive use of ICT in the rest of the economy. In addition the U.S. economy has also benefited 
from a greater flexibility of markets in allocating resources to their most productive uses. This is 
partly realised through the labour market, as the substitution of low-skilled for high-skilled labour has 
proceeded more smoothly and the restructuring of the economy was not hindered. It has also been 
realised through product markets, in particular through the creation of new opportunities for 
productive applications of ICT mainly in service industries and service-related activities in 
manufacturing. Finally, the combination of reforms and adoption of new technologies has supported 
creativity of firms and entrepreneurs to develop new products and services and to reshape the 
organisational and production processes by which these are brought to the market. 
                                                     
2 Business cycles in the U.S. and the EU are not completed synchronised. However, the divergent trend growth 
rates are clear.  
 3
Figure 1. 























Note: EU refers to 15 EU membership as before 1 May 2004. 
Source:  Groningen Growth and Development Centre and The Conference Board (2004) 
 
Unfortunately there is much less consensus on the causes of the slowdown in Europe. Indeed the 
reasons for the limited impact of technology, innovation and structural reforms on economic growth 
in Europe are still poorly understood. The urgency to better grasp the causes of the problems is 
underlined in the recent review by the Kok Commission of the Lisbon agenda for reform in Europe, 
which aims to improve Europe’s competitiveness (European Commission, 2004). Indeed, the Kok 
report strongly argues for a revival of productivity growth in Europe, in particular in the light of 
demographic trends towards a smaller labour force relative to the total population in Europe. 
 
At the same time, however, there is also considerable diversity in terms of both productivity growth as 
well as comparative levels between European countries. Comparative growth rates of labour 
productivity between 1995 and 2003 differ between –0.2 per cent (for Spain) and 5.4 per cent (for 
Ireland). And there is a variation of plus 21 percentage points (for Belgium) and minus 47 per cent 
(for Portugal) in terms of each country’s productivity level relative to the US in 2002. Hence although 
there are also some common traces to the European growth problem, one cannot simply treat the 
European area as homogeneous. 
 
These developments – the application of ICT and the introduction of modern techniques and 
innovation more generally, and the structural reforms of the economy - cannot be fully understood 
without adopting an industry perspective to output, input and productivity performance. Thus there is 
a need to go beneath the aggregate numbers to ascertain to what extent variations across countries are 
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largely explained by industry structure. In addition it needs to be considered whether these features 
are common to all or just a subset of EU countries. 
 
This paper argues that the European slowdown in growth is a reflection of an adjustment process 
towards a new industrial structure, which has developed more slowly in the EU than in the US. Rapid 
diffusion of new technology will facilitate the adjustment process in the future. However, an 
institutional environment that slows down change may hold up the structural adjustment process in 
Europe and inhibit the reallocation of resources to their most productive uses. The European 
economic environment creates too little room for good firms to excel and for failing firms to exit the 
market so as to free up resources for the much-needed transition. 
 
This paper begins with a brief review of the aggregate estimates of productivity and per capita income 
in order to identify the extent to which labour market developments rather than productivity has 
impacted the comparative performance of the EU relative to the U.S. (Section 2). I then proceed to 
examine differential growth performance at industry level (Section 3). In particular I distinguish 
between industry groups that are typically characterized as producers of ICT, intensive users of ICT – 
measured by their investment intensity – or less intensive ICT users. I identify the specific role of 
intensive ICT-using industries in services as the key to understanding the productivity differential 
between the EU and the U.S.. I then focus more specifically on the role of services by identifying the 
possible reasons for differences in productivity growth rates, namely (1) problems with macro-
economic measurement of service performance, (2) a genuine shortfall in innovative capacity of 
service industries in Europe, and (3) a lack of reforms to exploit the productivity potential of service 
innovation (Section 4). In the final section, I focus on the question whether the European Union needs 
to change or intensify its strategies to revive productivity growth (Section 5). My argument is that a 
specific productivity agenda is not needed. Instead policy mechanisms, such as macroeconomic 
management, existing innovation and reform policies and some horizontal policy measures (in 
particular education policies) should be reconsidered for their effects on the allocation of resources 




2. A Trade-off between Labour Intensity and Productivity? 
 
Table 1 shows the growth rates of per capita income (measured as GDP per capita) and labour 
productivity (measured as GDP per hour worked) for major regions in the world economy with a 
breakdown to individual European countries. The table shows a large variation in per capita income 
and productivity growth rates in European countries. Within the “old” EU-15, the variation of 
productivity growth is between -0.2% (for Spain) and 5.4% (for Ireland) between 1995 and 2003. 
Productivity growth in the new member states is higher but also varies much between -0.7% (Malta) 
and 13% (Lithuania) during 1995-2003.  
 
On average EU labour productivity growth is not only slower than in the U.S., but also compared to 
Japan and the average of other OECD countries. In terms of GDP per capita growth, the differences 
are not as big. Between 1995 and 2003 EU-25 per capita income growth was about the same as in the 
U.S. and substantially higher than in Japan. 
 
GDP per capita growth is driven by an increased input of labour and/or labour productivity growth. 
Indeed one can simply show that the difference in the growth rates of average per capita income and 
labour productivity can be accounted for by changes in a range of labour market and population 
indicators (see van Ark and McGuckin, 1999; McGuckin and van Ark, 2004). First, the growth in 
income per head of the population (∆O/P) is a function of the change in labour productivity  (∆O/H) 
and labour intensity, expressed as the number of working hours per head on the population (∆H/P): 
 
∆O/P  = ∆O/H * ∆H/P (1) 
 
The change in working hours per person can be decomposed into the change in hours worked per 
person employed (H/E) and the change in the share of employment in the total population (E/P): 
 
∆H/P = ∆H/E * ∆E/P (2)
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Table 1: Growth Rates of Per Capita Income and Labor Productivity Growth, 1980-2003
1980-1995 1990-1995 1995-2003 of which 1980-1995 1990-1995 1995-2003 of which
2000-2003 2000-2003
European Union (EU-15, present)(a) 1.7 1.0 1.9 1.0 2.3 2.3 1.5 1.0
Austria 1.8 1.2 1.8 0.8 1.7 1.8 2.5 1.4
Belgium 1.6 1.3 1.8 0.6 2.0 2.3 1.7 0.0
Denmark 1.8 1.6 1.7 0.7 2.5 2.4 1.7 1.2
Finland 1.3 -1.4 3.4 1.5 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.4
France 1.4 0.6 1.7 0.8 2.4 1.4 2.1 1.5
Germany 1.6 1.0 1.1 0.2 2.6 2.7 1.9 1.2
Greece 0.9 0.6 3.5 3.9 0.9 0.6 2.6 2.9
Ireland 3.6 4.1 6.9 4.0 3.7 3.6 5.4 4.6
Italy 1.8 1.1 1.3 0.6 2.1 2.3 0.6 -0.4
   Luxembourg 3.5 2.5 3.8 1.0 2.9 2.3 1.2 -1.1
Netherlands 1.8 1.1 1.3 0.6 2.1 2.3 0.6 -0.4
Portugal 2.5 1.6 2.1 -0.2 2.5 3.6 1.6 0.3
Spain 2.3 1.3 3.2 2.3 3.0 2.3 -0.2 -0.1
Sweden 1.2 0.1 2.4 1.3 1.4 2.0 2.3 2.2
U.K. 2.1 1.3 2.3 1.7 2.4 2.9 2.0 1.9
European Union (EU-10, new)(b) -- -- 3.8 3.1 -- -- 4.3 4.8
Cyprus -- -- 2.7 2.1 -- -- 1.9 0.9
Czech Republic -- -- 1.8 2.7 -- -- 2.9 4.5
Estonia -- -- 6.6 7.0 -- -- 7.3 7.1
Hungary -- -- 4.1 3.7 -- -- 2.7 3.2
Latvia -- -- 7.0 8.1 -- -- 6.1 7.5
Lithuania -- -- 5.6 7.7 -- -- 7.7 13.0
Malta -- -- 2.0 -1.0 -- -- 1.9 -0.7
Poland -- -- 3.9 2.1 -- -- 4.9 4.4
Slovakia -- -- 3.7 3.9 -- -- 4.9 6.7
Slovenia -- -- 3.6 2.8 -- -- 3.1 2.7
European Union (EU-25, enlarged)(c) -- -- 2.1 1.2 -- -- 1.9 1.5
United States 1.9 1.2 2.2 0.9 1.3 1.1 2.4 2.9
Japan 2.7 1.2 1.0 0.8 2.6 1.9 2.2 2.0
Other OECD members 1.8 1.5 2.3 1.4 1.2 0.9 2.2 2.0
Chinad 6.3 7.4 6.6 7.7 4.9 6.5 6.3 7.1
a) referring to membership of the European Union until 30 April 2004; b) referring to new membership of the European Union as of 1 May 2004
c) referring to all members of the European Union as of 1 May 2004 (see Table 2): d) productivity in China is in terms of GDP per person employed
Source: TCB/GGDC Total Economy Database (www.ggdc.net/dseries), based on OECD National Accounts and Labour Force Statistics
GDP per capita GDP per hour worked
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The change in the employment/population ratio (E/P) can be further broken down into the number of 
persons employed relative to the total labour force (i.e., employed persons plus registered unemployed 
persons) (E/L), the ratio of the labour force to all persons aged 15 to 64 (i.e., the working age 
population) (L/P1564) and the share of the working age population in the total population (P1564/P): 
 
∆E/P = ∆E/L * ∆L/P1564 * ∆P1564/P (3) 
 
Table 2 looks at the breakdown of per capita income into labour market indicators and productivity 
from the perspective of comparative levels of European countries relative to the United States for 
2003. The estimates are converted on the basis of purchasing power parities, which take account of 
differences in relative price levels across countries. 
 
It is clear from the table that the comparative levels of labour productivity in the “old” EU-15 
countries were substantially higher relative to the United States than the relative per capita income 
levels. This is mainly due to the substantially lower number of working hours per employed person 
and, in addition, to a lower ratio of employed persons relative to the total population. 
 
The relative high levels of labour productivity in Europe have been pointed at by various scholars as 
an indication of a “European model” that deals differently with the trade-off between labour intensity 
and productivity than the U.S. model. According to, for example, Blanchard (2004) and Gordon 
(2004) the European preference for more leisure would be offset against a lower level of per capita 
income. Moreover, Gordon argues that a significant portion of higher American GDP per capita is 
required to create decent living conditions in a much harsher natural environment (requiring a greater 
use of energy for heating and air-conditioning), to fight crime and to travel longer distances across 
huge metropolitan areas. 
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GDP/hour %US Ratio GDP/cap %US
European Union (EU-15, present)(a) 40.2 93% -13.6% -6.6% 27546 72%
Luxembourg 52.2 121% -17.2% 37.5% 53958 141%
France 50.2 117% -26.9% -13.2% 28788 75%
Belgium 47.8 111% -15.4% -17.6% 29582 77%
Ireland 46.5 108% -12.2% -4.5% 35035 91%
Netherlands 44.7 104% -27.4% 3.3% 29691 77%
Austria 42.8 99% -17.4% -2.2% 29991 78%
Germany 42.6 99% -20.2% -6.8% 26937 70%
Denmark 41.1 95% -17.7% 3.4% 30687 80%
Italy 39.7 92% -11.5% -9.3% 26721 70%
Finland 39.4 92% -11.6% -3.5% 29146 76%
U.K. 38.6 90% -9.8% -1.2% 29935 78%
Sweden 37.9 88% -12.3% 1.3% 29387 77%
Spain 32.1 75% -0.7% -9.4% 24447 64%
Greece 27.3 64% 4.4% -12.7% 21180 55%
Portugal 22.6 53% -3.4% 1.8% 19017 50%
European Union (EU-10, new)(b) 17.5 41% 2.6% -8.1% 13603 35%
Malta 26.8 62% 4.5% -18.4% 18102 47%
Slovenia 24.9 58% 4.2% -9.0% 20418 53%
Cyprus 22.2 52% 8.7% -8.3% 19692 51%
Hungary 21.8 51% -1.1% -9.2% 15569 41%
Czech Republic 18.4 43% 2.1% -1.4% 16733 44%
Slovakia 17.9 42% -0.1% -6.5% 13625 36%
Poland 16.7 39% 3.0% -10.7% 12153 32%
Lithuania 12.7 29% 5.4% -5.4% 11739 31%
Estonia 12.5 29% 3.5% -3.3% 11490 30%
Latvia 10.3 24% 4.1% -0.5% 11065 29%
European Union (EU-25, enlarged)(c) 36.1 84% -9.7% -7.4% 25261 66%
U.S.A 43.0 100% 0.0% 0.0% 38324 100%
Japan 32.2 75% -2.3% 3.6% 29193 76%
Canada 34.6 80% -2.7% 2.1% 30197 79%
Australia 35.1 82% -2.7% 1.2% 30440 79%
a) referring to membership of the European Union  until 30 April 2004 (see Table 1)
b) referring to new membership of the European Union as of 1 May 2004 (see Table 1)
c) referring to all members of the European Union as of 1 May 2004 (see Table 1)
Source: TCB/GGDC Total Economy Database (www.ggdc.net/dseries), based on OECD National Accounts
and Labour Force Statistics, with GDP converted to US$ at 2002 EKS PPPs.
Productivity Per IncomeCapita 
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While there may be some truth in these arguments, it remains questionable whether the differences 
between Europe and the U.S. in terms of labour intensity do not also partly reflect differences in 
incentives for workers to supply their labour and business to demand it. Before jumping to the 
conclusion that Europeans value leisure more than Americans, it is important to ask the question how 
Europeans and Americans would allocate labour and leisure under the same set of circumstances. 
While a complete answer is beyond the scope of this report, it is perhaps useful to refer to Table 2 
which shows that not all countries in the world make the same trade-off between labour intensity and 
productivity as the “old EU-15” (for example, Australia, Canada or Japan). The European model is in 
fact rather an exception than the rule. Moreover, in the light of a downward trend in employment-
population ratios due to the relatively rapid greying of the European population, the low labour 
intensity levels in Europe are unlikely to be viable for much longer. The trade-off between labour 
intensity and productivity is therefore a false choice and will threaten living standards in the long run. 
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3. An Industry Perspective on Productivity Growth 
 
In this section we look at the productivity performance form an industry perspective.3 Although many 
of the policy issues related to the slowdown of productivity growth in Europe are more of a generic 
nature rather than industry specific, the sector perspective is useful for several reasons. Firstly, it is 
important to pinpoint in which industries or industry groups the slowdown occurs and to examine 
whether it is confined to a few sectors or whether it is more widespread. Secondly, under the influence 
from both intra-EU economic integration and the on-going globalization of product markets and factor 
markets, the industry structure is under continuous pressure from competitive forces. It is important to 
establish how these changes have affected the overall performance of the economy. Finally, the 
opportunities for new technological applications may have very different implications for industries. 
Indeed the absorptive capacity for ICT differs highly across industries, and has very different impacts 
on output, employment and productivity performance.  
 
For the analysis of productivity growth in Europe and the U.S., the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre developed a database, which contains information on value added and 
employment for 56 industries between 1979 and 2002. On the basis of this data set measures of labour 
productivity growth and the contribution of individual industries to aggregate productivity growth can 
be calculated.4 Table 3 summarizes the contributions of the industries with the largest contributions to 
productivity growth. The table shows that the U.S. is characterized by a much greater contribution 
from the five largest contributors than the EU. Of the five largest contributors in the U.S., which 
account for 61% (1.4 %-point) of productivity growth (in gross terms), four are services industries. 
Together these five industries account for only 30% (0.5 %-point) of productivity growth in the EU. 
The five largest contributors in the EU add only 44% (0.7 %-points) to EU productivity growth. In the 
U.S. these same industries account for 31% (0.7 %-point) of productivity growth. 
 
                                                     
3 For comparisons of productivity in the European Union and the U.S. at the aggregate level, see for example, 
van Ark et al. (2002) and Timmer and van Ark (2005) 
4 See www.ggdc.net/dseries/60_Industry.shtml, van Ark et al. (2003a) and O’Mahony and van Ark (2003). 
The main source is the new OECD STAN Database of national accounts, but greater industry detail is provided 
through the use of industry surveys and censuses. 
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Table 3: Contribution to aggregate labour productivity of 5 industries that contribute most to productivity
growth in the U.S. and the EU-15, 1995-2002
%-point %-contribution %-point %-contribution
contribution contribution
5 Largest contributors in US
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except 0.36 15% 0.08 5%
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and moto 0.34 14% 0.07 4%
Electronic valves and tubes 0.32 14% 0.11 7%
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.23 10% 0.02 1%
Communications 0.18 8% 0.22 13%
5 Largest contributors in EU
Communications 0.18 8% 0.22 13%
Computer and related activities 0.09 4% 0.14 9%
Legal, technical and advertising 0.07 3% 0.13 8%
Health and social work 0.06 2% 0.11 7%
Electronic valves and tubes 0.32 14% 0.11 7%
Aggregate Labour productivity growth 2.37 100% 1.66 100%
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, February 2005, http://www.ggdc.net
US 1995-2002 EU-15 1995-2002
 
 
The level of detail in the industry database is sufficient to adequately distinguish between 
ICT producing industries, ICT using industries and industries that make less intensive use of 
ICT (Table 4). The ICT producing industries include producers of IT hardware, 
communication equipment, telecommunications and computer services (including software). 
The distinction is based on an OECD classification (see, for example, OECD 2002). Apart 
from distinguishing ICT producing industries, we also distinguish between industries that 
make intensive use of ICT from those that are less intensive users. This is a less 
straightforward distinction since nearly every part of the economy uses some ICT. As a 
measure of ICT intensity, we rely on the share of ICT capital in total capital compensation in 
the United States (van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin, 2003).5  
 
 
                                                     
5 See van Ark et al. (2003) for an overview of all ICT producing, ICT using and non-ICT industries.  
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EU-15 Germany US EU-15 Germany US
Total Economy a 2.3 2.1 1.2 1.8 1.9 2.5
ICT Producing Industries 6.8 7.4 7.2 8.6 12.2 9.3
ICT Producing Manufacturingb 11.6 10.0 15.1 16.2 14.6 23.5
ICT Producing Services 4.4 5.5 2.4 5.9 10.9 2.7
ICT Using Industries c 2.3 2.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 4.9
ICT Using Manufacturing 2.7 1.9 0.8 2.0 1.9 2.6
ICT Using Services 2.0 2.5 1.9 1.7 1.8 5.3
of which:
Whosale Trade 2.4 2.3 3.5 1.5 1.6 8.1
Retail Trade 1.7 2.0 2.4 1.5 1.3 7.1
Financial Services 1.9 2.7 1.5 2.3 3.4 5.0
ICT-intensive Business Services 0.8 1.6 -0.9 0.6 -0.6 0.7
Non-ICT Industries 1.9 1.5 0.4 1.1 1.0 0.2
Non-ICT Manufacturing 3.2 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.6 1.2
Non-ICT Servicesa 0.8 1.0 -0.3 0.5 0.4 0.2
Non-ICT Other 3.4 1.6 1.4 2.1 2.2 0.4
a) excluding real estate
c) excluding ICT producing
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, February 2005, http://www.ggdc.net
Notes: industry grouping into ICT-producing industries from OECD; distinction between ICT-using industries and 
less intensive ICT users is based on share of ICT capital services in total capital services from nonresidential 
capital; see Van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin (2003) for exact industry grouping.
Table 4: Average annual growth of GDP per hour worked of ICT-producing, ICT-using and non-ICT 
industries in European Union, Japan and the U.S.,1979-1995 and 1995-2002
1979-1995 1995-2002




Table 4 shows that there is considerable variation in productivity growth across the industry groups. 
In ICT producing manufacturing, labour productivity growth rates in both the U.S. and the EU-15 are 
considerably higher than for all other sectors and show a similar time pattern with accelerated growth 
in the late 1990s, although at a higher rate in the U.S.. In contrast, ICT producing service sectors 
experienced high growth rates in the EU, outperforming the U.S., in particular during the later period. 
This is the only ICT industry group for which the EU shows an acceleration from the mid 1990s 
which is bigger than in the U.S.. The latter is mainly due to the negative productivity growth rates in 
U.S. computer services. But overall ICT producing services represent only a small share of total 
economy value added, about 5% in both the U.S. and EU.  
 
The two ICT using sectors generally show considerably lower growth rates than the corresponding 
ICT producing sectors with the important exception of the ICT using services group in the U.S. which 
from 1995 onwards shows a sharp acceleration not matched in the EU-15. This was mainly due to a 
major increase in productivity and output growth in distribution (retail and wholesale trade) and 
financial services in the U.S. as shown in Table 4. Equally important in Table 4 is the pronounced 
deceleration of productivity growth in non-ICT industries in the EU, which occurs in all three 
subcomponents. In non-ICT manufacturing, labour productivity growth decreases in the final period 
in both the U.S. and the EU-15. However the U.S. shows a marginal improvement in non-ICT 
services, and since this comprises over 60% of the non-ICT group, the overall reduction in U.S. 
productivity growth in non-ICT industries since 1995 is lower than in the EU. Nevertheless 
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productivity growth rates in the non-ICT sectors are much lower than in ICT using industries in both 
the U.S. than in the EU. 
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4. What explains slow productivity growth in services? 
 
The previous section has shown that the productivity slowdown in the EU economy can be largely 
traced to the service sector of the economy, and more in particular those services that are the most 
intensive users of ICT. Various explanations can be put forward for this phenomenon. Here I address 
three reasons which have been suggested most frequently, namely (1) problems with macro-economic 
measurement of service performance, (2) a genuine shortfall in innovative capacity of service 
industries in Europe, and (3) a lack of reforms to exploit the productivity potential of service 
innovation. 
 
Ad 1) Measurement problems in services 
In the past few years there have been increasing concerns about whether the macroeconomic statistics 
correctly trace the changes at industry level. In practice, the quality of measures of output and 
productivity differs highly across industries and between countries. Griliches (1994) showed a striking 
difference between the acceleration of labour productivity growth in ‘measurable’ sectors of the U.S. 
economy (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transport and communication, and public utilities) and 
the slowdown in ‘unmeasurable’ sectors (like construction, trade, the financial sector, ‘other’ market 
services and government) over past decades. Apart from an increase in measurement error at the 
aggregate level due to shift towards the unmeasurable sectors of the economy, one may also observe 
an increase in measurement problems in the ‘unmeasurable’ sector itself. This component of the rise 
in measurement problems may – at least in part – be related to the increased use of ICT.  
 
In practice the largest measurement problems relate to the measurement of output in the service 
sector. The current methodology of splitting the change in output value into a quantity component and 
a price component is difficult to apply to many service activities, as often no clear quantity component 
can be distinguished. Moreover, possible changes in the quality of services are also difficult to 
measure. These problems are not new, and improvement in measurement of service output has been a 
topic on the agenda of statisticians and academics for a long time.6 In many service industries 
information on inputs (such as labour income) was and still is used as a proxy for output. However, 
the increased importance of ICT may have accelerated quality changes in services and raised the 
potential for productivity growth in services, which was previously not envisaged.7 However, to 
include those quality aspects in the output measure, multiple dimensions of a service need to be taken 
into account, for example, the service concept, the type of client interface and the service delivery 
system (den Hertog and Bilderbeek, 1999). This implies that the real output of a particular service 
cannot be measured on the basis of one single quantity indicator. New measurement methods make 
use of various volume measures in, for example, financial services (e.g, in the Netherlands and in the 
United States) and health services and other government services (e.g., in the United Kingdom). Even 
though such changes in measurement methods have not exclusively led to upward adjustments of real 
output, on balance the bias is probably towards an understatement of the growth in real service output 
                                                     
6 See, for example, Griliches (1992), Wölfl (2003) and Triplett and Bosworth (2004). 
7 See, for example, Baumol (2004) and Triplett and Bosworth (2002). 
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(Triplett and Bosworth, 2004). There is no evidence, however, that this bias is in any way bigger in 
Europe than in the U.S..  
 
 
Ad 2) A lack of innovation in services? 
It is sometimes claimed in the literature that slower productivity growth in services in Europe is 
related to a lack of innovation. However, there is little direct evidence to substantiate this claim. 
Although ICT investment  – as was seen in the previous section –is an important enabler of innovation 
and productivity growth, and as the U.S. has been more successful in obtaining productivity effects 
from ICT investment than EU, the productive use of ICT investment is strongly dependent on various 
dimensions of non-technological innovations.  
 
There are different ways to go about measuring non-technological innovation and its impact on 
productivity growth. The 56 industries, identified in Section 3, can be re-arranged o measure 
productivity growth on the basis of the type of innovation in the industry (van Ark et al., 2003b). A 
crucial consideration for such a service innovation typology is the way in which suppliers of inputs 
(machines, computers, and human capital), the service company and its customers (consumers of 
intermediary users) interact. In the service patterns described below, the customer has an increasing 
influence on the innovation process in the first four patterns. 
‘Supplier’-dominated innovation. This usually involves technological innovations in the 
manufacturing sector that are implemented in the service sector through investment in new computers. 
Although there may be limited scope within a company for influencing the service itself, it may utilize 
the innovation by making non-technological changes to aspects such as staff training and the way in 
which the service is delivered. 
Innovation in services. Actual innovation and implementation takes place within the service 
organization itself. These innovations may be technological or non-technological in nature or, as is 
usually the case, a combination of the two. Typical examples are the development of a new service 
concept, the combination of different service functions, or a new method of service delivery 
developed by the organization itself. These innovations are often implemented in co-operation with 
partners from the private and/or public sectors. 
Customer-led innovation. This type of innovation is implemented by service providers in response to 
the specific and clear wishes of customers. In some cases, providers respond to the demand in specific 
market segments. In many other cases, the innovation is initiated by a single customer. This often 
happens in the market for business services. The client of an educational institute may request a 
customized IT course to teach specific IT skills to staff. 
Innovation through services. According to this pattern of innovation, the service organization 
contributes to the customer’s innovation process. In many cases, the supplier of the intermediate 
service provides the knowledge that is required by the customer for an innovation process. This 
pattern prevails in knowledge-intensive business services, such as engineering consultancies.8  
                                                     
8 A fifth category that may be considered is so-called paradigmatic innovation. Certain innovations are more 
radical than the incremental innovations that usually take place in service companies. They usually follow from 
breakthrough technologies, such as IT, and lead to far-reaching and complex changes. Paradigmatic innovations 
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Table 5 presents labour productivity growth rates in the EU and the US when industries are grouped 
according to their innovation patterns in services: 
In sector characterized by supplier-dominated innovation, the U.S. acceleration in productivity growth 
is mainly due to the retail trade industry. The U.S. also shows an improvement in productivity growth 
in communication, but the productivity growth in the EU communications sector is higher than in the 
U.S. also after 1995. 
However, in specialised supplier services (“innovation through services”), the EU outperforms the 
U.S., which is mainly due to the strongly negative labour productivity growth rates in U.S. computer 
services. Also knowledge intensive business services show a somewhat better performance in the EU. 
On the other hand, productivity growth rates in dedicated R&D firms in the U.S. are higher than in the 
EU. 
Organisational innovative services (“innovation in services”) show a better performance in the U.S. 
than in the EU during the period since 1995. Banking services have shown a strong productivity 
improvement in both regions, whereas insurance services have experienced a slowdown in both 
regions. But there is large heterogeneity across EU countries. The strong productivity advantage in 
EU air transport services over the US has been reversed after 1995. 
Considering client-led industries, a heterogeneous pattern can be seen in Table 5.  The US 
experiences considerable growth in this sector, which includes industries such as wholesale, hotel and 
catering and business services, in the latter part of the 1990s.  The EU lags behind the US, but when 
the country breakdown is taken into account, some countries are more similar to the US and 
experience less erratic labour productivity growth than other EU member countries.   
It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the non-market services collection of industries since 
this is likely to consist of services where outputs and inputs are difficult to measure.  On average the 
EU shows a better productivity performance in non-market services than in the U.S.. But when the EU 
is broken down into individual countries, there is much heterogeneity within and between countries 
over the two time periods.  One also should take into account the substantial measurement problems 
in non-market services. 
 
Table 5: Labour productivity growth according to pattern of service innovation  
                                                                                                                                                                     
in the service sector primarily affect the value chain. They often require participation and a change of behaviour 
by all players in the innovation, including co-operating companies, the public sector and consumers. An 
example of paradigmatic innovation is the introduction of the chip-card or the construction of an underground 
transport system. This fifth pattern of service innovation has a somewhat different character than the previous 
four as it deals with how “radical” an innovation is rather than where to place the source and sink of innovation 
in the value chain. This innovation pattern signals the possibility that some major service innovations may affect 
all players in a value chain and require major (interdependent) changes in behaviour by all players involved. 
However, our industry classification does not include any specific service industry where “paradigmatic” 
innovation occurred. 
 17
EU DEU US EU DEU US
Service industries
Supplier dominated services 2.9 3.1 2.3 4.0 5.4 6.8
Specialised suppliers services 0.7 1.3 -0.4 0.8 0.3 -0.2
Organizational innovative services 2.6 3.2 1.4 2.1 3.0 3.3
Client led services 0.7 1.2 1.2 0.2 -0.2 4.2
Non-market services 0.8 0.9 -0.5 0.8 0.8 -0.5
1979-1995 1995-2002




In summary, the most important observation on productivity growth in services related to innovation 
patterns, is the strong acceleration of U.S. productivity growth in services that depend on innovation 
by their suppliers. This industry group is dominated by retail trade. The strong improvement in U.S. 
retail trade has also gone together with strong productivity growth in wholesale trade, which explains 
the US advantage in client led services. These industries benefited from the supply of ICT, but have 
also undergone significant organizational innovations. Indeed in industries that are primarily 
characterized by organizational innovations, U.S. performance has also strongly improved, in 
particular in banking. Within the EU, the experiences in service productivity growth are mixed across 
industries and countries. Although services will be an important engine for future productivity 
improvements, the exploitation of the potential for productivity growth will be strongly dependent on 
national circumstances, including the nature of the innovation system and the working of product and 
labour markets 
 
Ad 3) A lack of reforms in services? 
There has been much discussion in the literature about the link between, on the one hand, the 
performance of product and labour markets and, on the other hand, innovation and productivity. The 
basic argument has been that regulation restricts competition to a much greater extent in Europe than 
in the United States. Quantifying these differences is difficult, but a wide variety of evidence suggests 
that regulation does indeed matter.9  
 
However, explaining sluggish productivity growth in Europe by broadly casting it as overregulated 
and uncompetitive is not very useful analytically. There is much variety and subtlety in the way by 
which regulation affects service productivity and innovation. It is essential to understand if and how 
regulation constrains productivity. Instead of giving an overall view of the interaction, it may be 
preferable to focus on one specific industry. Given the major role of the retail sector in explaining the 
productivity growth differential in services, a more detailed discussion of regulation in this sector may 
help to understand the issues better.10  
 
                                                     
9 See, for example, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).  
10 See McGuckin, Spiegelman and van Ark (2005). 
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One simple assessment of competition in retailing is to examine the absolute level of the margins 
retailers are able to make on sales. High margins are suggestive of a less competitive environment, 
because retailers are able to extract monopolistic rents. As competition increases, retailers will no 
longer be able to maintain very high margins—competitors will forcefully drive them down. Gross 
margins are generally lower in the United States than in any European country, with only Germany 
approaching U.S. levels.11 Nonetheless, margins are far from a perfect measure of competition and 
may indicate differences in capital and labour costs, as well as other factors. 
 
There are three other categories of regulation that can be logically associated with stunted 
productivity growth in Europe—store opening hours, land usage restrictions (especially on large 
stores), and labour laws.12  
 
Most European countries have some type of regulation on large stores operating on Sundays (the 
United Kingdom being a major exception). Germany has some of the tightest regulations in all of 
Europe, defined by the Ladenschlussgesetz (Shop Closing Hours Act), which currently only allows 
stores to open 6 a.m. to 8 p.m. The United Kingdom and France, on the other hand, generally have no 
limits on opening hours during the week. The trend has definitely been towards liberalisation, and 
both local and national regulations are moving in the direction of greater flexibility. But remaining 
restrictions still reduce shopping time and limit customer convenience. In the longer run short opening 
hours limit the potential for accelerated productivity growth. 
 
Local planning rules also impact on productivity in retailing, as restrictions on retail land usage cut 
back on both the creation of new stores and the elimination of old ones. The rules make it very costly 
to build new stores (fewer entrants) and artificially inflate the value of old stores based on the land 
they occupy. As land use regulations usually discriminate against large store sizes it affects the scale 
advantages that can contribute to productivity growth. The policies of European countries differ with 
those in the United States. The United States has taken a largely decentralised, disorganised, market-
driven approach to retail development. While far from uniform, Europe is generally more restrictive 
of new retail establishments. By far, the strictest regulation occurs in the United Kingdom where 
development sites are highly restricted, with the result that retail property costs are significantly 
higher than in continental Europe or the United States. Germany also has a complex zoning law, but 
the regulatory threshold is 1,200 square meters (as opposed to, for example, 300 m2 in France). 
Combined with the operating hour restrictions, this encouraged the development of relatively small, 
highly productive discounters like Aldi and Lidl. 
 
The efficient and flexible use of labour is as critical for success as strategic management of space and 
land. European labour is generally more expensive than in the United States. France and Germany 
generally have much higher minimum wages than the United Kingdom or the United States, reducing 
the number of services provided in the retail environment of the former two countries. Leaving out 
from the labour force the low paid group may paradoxically increase measured productivity. French 
                                                     
11 Gross margin data are taken from Boylaud (2000). 
12 Other regulations such as price controls and restrictions on promotional activities play some role, but they are 
not likely to be as significant. 
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retail labour productivity has historically been very high, and up until 1995 was greater than in the 
United States. But this is not a real efficiency gain as work is simply transferred to the customer.  
 
In summary, while the overall picture points in the directions of regulations hampering productivity 
growth in services in Europe, there are many subtleties in how it exactly impacts on productivity 
growth. There are large differences between EU countries. In fact the lack of a harmonised regulation 
system in itself is often cited as a major difficulty in building cross-border operations within Europe. 
It should also be stressed that complete deregulation is not always the best way to raise productivity 
growth. Moreover, there is a substantial time lag in reforms impacting on productivity. In this respect, 
it remains an important question whether the European slowdown is just a reflection of a lagged 
reform process, or that rigid institutions and regulations hamper the adjustment process. 
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5. Does the European Union need a Productivity Agenda? 
 
On balance, this paper suggests that the European slowdown in productivity growth is a reflection of 
an adjustment process towards a new industrial structure, which has developed more slowly in the EU 
than in the U.S.. But with some delay, rapid diffusion of new technology may ultimately facilitate the 
adjustment process towards a faster growth track in Europe. After all, the United States has also gone 
through a phase of slow productivity growth during the 1980s.13 However, an institutional 
environment that slows down change may hold up the structural adjustment process in Europe and 
inhibit the reallocation of resources to their most productive uses.  
 
In a market economy the main way for public policy makers to promote and support faster 
productivity growth is to try and encourage private enterprises to move in a productivity-enhancing 
direction. For this government can use a mix of four main policy mechanisms, which are only partly 
directly targeted towards productivity-enhancing measures. 
 
The first mechanism concerns macro-economic management, which influences the relative prices of 
capital and labour inputs and hence determines the choice of technology. It may be argued that wage 
moderation policies and active labour market policies (which have been applied in a different mix and 
intensity in European countries) have lowered the price of labour relative to capital in Europe. 
Although conclusive evidence on the precise relationship is still lacking, the relative decline in the 
price of labour may have impacted the slowdown in the growth of the capital-labour ratio during the 
1990s. For many European countries this slowdown can be clearly observed and is an important 
source for the slower growth in labour productivity. 
 
However, the main explanation for the slowdown in Europe comes from slower growth in total factor 
productivity, i.e. productivity growth corrected for the change in capital-labour ratios (Timmer and 
van Ark, 2005). Total factor productivity growth is often related to technological change. The second 
policy mechanism, which includes measures directed to support technological change and innovation, 
is therefore very popular with governments. However, direct support of particular industries or 
technology areas easily raises questions on whether governments are able to make the right choices. 
Nevertheless it is clear that governments have a responsibility for creating the “rules of the game” 
concerning technology creation and diffusion. Technology creating measures are of particular 
importance for moving the productivity frontier and improving best practices, and include measures 
such as R&D subsidization and the creation of effective patent systems. Technology diffusing 
measures play a major role in reducing the productivity gap between average and best practice firms, 
including best practices abroad. They involve the facilitating of training programmes, support of 
innovation platforms and other ways of co-operation between government and business. 
 
The investment decisions concerning tangible and intangible capital, and the (re)allocations of these 
inputs to industries and firms, are taken in an environment, governed by markets in which supply and 
demand for factor inputs (labour and capital markets) and product and services (product markets) are 
matched. Governments play an important role in setting the “rules of the game” (or institutions) of 
                                                     
13 See, for example, Dertouzos et al. (1989). 
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these markets, which is the third main policy mechanism. In the past many existing institutional 
settings or regulatory arrangements have originally been set up with the motivation to smooth the 
functioning of the markets, by streamlining rules on competition, business conduct, labour markets, 
consumer protection, public safety, health and so on. However, regulations may have become a drag 
to the extent that they limit the efficiency of market functioning, reduce entry of new firms and delay 
exits. There has been an increasing awareness of the need for an innovation-specific focus on 
(de)regulation and its impact on growth and productivity performance in the knowledge economy. 
The opportunities to exploit new technologies are to a large extent determined by the regulatory 
environment. There is much evidence that higher entry and exit rates of firm within industries are 
supportive of faster productivity growth (OECD, 2003).  
 
Finally, “horizontal policies”, which represent the fourth main policy mechanism, concern policies 
that are not directly related to innovation, are at least as important to improve service innovation 
activity. As human capital is a key input in the innovation process, there is a clear role for the 
government to provide an adequate formal education system. More specifically governments should 
support a higher education system that has the flexibility to train excellent researchers, to support their 
mobility, and to allow business to tap into the knowledge of universities and other higher education 
institutions for commercial purposes. 
 
The optimal mix of these four main policy mechanisms is difficult to determine. It depends on such 
factors as the distance relative to the world technology and/or productivity frontier, which may differ 
between industries. It may also depend on the state of institutional reform in particular markets. 
Finally, the nature of the political reality implies that all public policy interventions are likely to 
involve costs as well as benefits.  
 
The key to productivity improvements is with business itself. For business there is a choice between a 
strategy focused on cost reductions through scrapping and postponement of investments in new 
capital goods and intangibles, or by restructuring through upgrading the resources and overcoming the 
bottlenecks which account for the difference between average and best practice in a given (local) 
market. Of course,  rapid restructuring through cuts has also often been propagated as the recipe for 
the recovery of U.S. and global firms in general. The fundamental difference is that when such a 
strategy is pursued in a market environment that is more flexible, it may help to reposition the firm, 
activate the resources and realize the potential. Another difference between the EU and the U.S. is that 
when entry and exit of firms is speeded up, the reallocation of resources to its most productive uses is 
strengthened. Hence in a more flexible market environment the strategy towards restructuring can be 
more easily aligned with exploiting the potential for growth and reducing the gap between average 
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